The charters, objectives and processes of these NBOs are likely to influence the impact that ethics may have in the development of national policy and the effect such policy developments may have on the character and development of bioethics. Some important differences in the roles of these bodies raise questions about how the structures and procedures of NBOs affect their influence, on health and medical research policy development and in articulating bioethical debate. This paper examines tensions between the structure, focus and processes of NBOs and realisation of the democratic goals that are explicitly or implicitly reflected in the speeches or policy documents establishing NBOs.
We argue for a consultative and contestable approach through which NBOs can Bioethics and Democracy 2 fulfil their roles in bioethical debate and in policy formation while preserving these democratic goals.
BIOETHICS AND THE DEMAND FOR PUBLIC POLICY
In establishing NBOs, states seek to establish processes that allow a diversity of views to be heard in a manner that is well informed, articulate, and responsive to both expert and "lay" public views. NBOs are typically given a range of responsibilities, including
• contributing to and stimulating public debate,
• providing expert opinion in identifying relevant issues that need to be addressed in policy deliberations, and/or
• developing public policy.
Areas of life, such as reproduction or access to health care, previously thought by liberal theorists to be wholly a matter of individual choice, and not a matter of public policy, regulation or legislative control, are now recognised by many researchers, practitioners, legislators and citizens to be matters about which the state has an interest. The source of this interest may be the state's role as a provider of welfare services, or as a protector of individual rights, or as a defender of a "common way" or shared set of values. Each of these justifications for regulation could be viewed, in a particular case, as excessive state interference on liberal grounds, nonetheless, these positions have been put forward in recent years in a range of public, legislative and academic fora.
Decisions about whether or not to regulate areas such as research involving expensive or risky medical technologies, use of stem cells in research or in Bioethics and Democracy 3 therapy, or cloning, are usually the outcome of a deliberation informed by public debate or in response to public outcry. NBOs can contribute to these decisions in varying ways. They can open up the public debate by promoting expression of the diversity of community views, clarifying that expression so that it is wellinformed, articulate and responsive to both expert and 'lay' public views and can directly contribute to policy formation.
In this paper we are interested in policy development that can be described as "bioethical policy". That is, where (1) the policy is recognised as involving contentious ethical debate in the areas of health and medical research, and (2) the policy process has been designed to reflect diversity of opinion and of ethical frameworks and seeks legitimacy through processes of public consultation. We are particularly interested in examining the capacity of NBOs to meet the democratic ideal of effective participation by the public, or citizenry-especially those people directly affected by the policies-in the development of effective public policy. We provide a basic framework for policy development involving
NBOs that could meet this ideal.
NATIONAL BIOETHICS ORGANISATIONS
Our concern with the capacity of NBOs to inform and reflect the diversity of values within a state on a bioethical policy issue in shaping policy, leads us to focus on a typical kind of NBO. The organisations to which our attention is directed are entities established by national governments, usually with a statutory base and a permanent existence, subject to periodic renewals of membership. Although we do not examine them, we recognise that the deliberations of these bodies may influence the development of national bioethics policy.
We exclude two types of national body. The first are bodies formed for narrow and specific inquiries, often into past conduct that has been ethically suspect. 
Policy-making NBOs
NBOs that do not have such direct public advisory powers are those national government established bodies whose characteristic mode of reporting is first to a government agency. We call these 'NBOs with defined policy-making roles'.
While it is a matter of debate whether (and when) ethical matters, including bioethical matters, ought to be regulated through public policy, governments increasingly rely on NBOs to provide policy advice that may contribute to legal advice from the NSTC, could accept suggestions from Congress or the public concerning issues to be examined and could, subject to approval from the NSTC, identify other issues for examination. The following were the criteria for determining priority for activities:
• public health or policy urgency,
• relations of bioethics issues to goals of Federal investment in science and technology,
• absence of another suitable body, and
• the extent of interest in the issue across the government.
The integration of NBAC into government processes was also evidenced by the in turn issues approved documents. Other than the specific reference to medical research involving humans, there is no provision relating to the sources from which AHEC can derive issues for its work. AHEC can be said, then, to have a specific responsibility to develop national policy governing research involving Bioethics and Democracy 10 human participants. Its membership comprises experts and representatives of specific interest groups thought to be commensurate to that task. Unlike NBAC, AHEC is required, under the Act, to pursue a public consultation process in relation to the health matters it considers. The scope of its public contribution to bioethical debate is framed by that policy role.
. NBOs IN PLURALIST LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES
In this section we explore alternative theoretical approaches to recognition of diversity in democracies, in the next section we show how these relate to the structure, role and processes of those NBOs with advisory roles and those with defined policy-making roles.
Our specific concern is to consider the relative merits of the two kinds of roles for NBOs: those whose roles are primarily advisory and those with a mandated policy-development role. We use contemporary work on democracy and public rationality to demonstrate our argument. All NBOs appointed by governments are influenced by governmental concerns (e.g. in membership and terms of reference). It is our view, however, that those NBOs with a genuinely advisory role may be better able to reflect the diversity of public and specialist opinion about important ethical matters affecting communities and thereby meet certain democratic goals of participation and public reasoning, than those NBOs that have a specific bioethics policy-making function.
By comparison, although those NBOs with specific policy-making responsibilities will have greater impact on practice, they are likely to be constricted in reflecting Diversity is more likely to be restricted to a set range of positions demanded by the policy framework (e.g. there will be representatives of one or two major religions, not representing the range of religious perspectives that may have specific concerns with a proposed area of policy development). Such NBOs are also likely to anticipate only a limited range of ethical viewpoints and expert positions, and therefore not fully represent in their considerations the diversity of issues raised in the wider public debate. Further, they are likely to be driven by political necessity, which will reduce the scope for disagreement in the face of the need for finalising a clear policy. This will result in some views being privileged and others being discounted. However, these NBOs are more capable of directly shaping policy.
BIOETHICS, DIVERSITY AND DEMOCRATIC POLICY MAKING
In discussing the relationship between democratic decision-making and public policy formation we focus on the process of debate through which a democratic polity articulates the values held by the members of the polity, which then inform policy makers. Liberal democracies are founded on the view that different individuals or groups can and do hold different values as fundamental, and these Bioethics and Democracy 13 differences ought to be respected in policy-making. 7 Precisely how these differences are to be respected is a matter of debate and we examine some of the alternatives below.
The legitimacy of policy in democracies depends, in large part, on the public deliberative processes that informed the policy: not on the substance of the policy, but on the process or public reasoning used to determine it coercion that could detract from the equality of the participants. Each has an equal opportunity to be heard, to introduce topics, to make contributions, to suggest and criticize proposals. …. 11 
PUBLIC DEBATE ABOUT BIOETHICAL ISSUES: DELIBERATION AND DEMOCRACY
The question of how NBOs ought to be understood and how they ought to go about their business, when addressing issues over which there is no clear public agreement about the ethical values at stake, is one specific manifestation of a characteristic tension for any liberal democracy. This is the tension between mere toleration of ethical differences and genuine respect for those differences in policy-making, given the impossibility of ethically neutral policy-making in matters that are the subject of hot ethical debate.
The legitimacy of public policies in liberal democratic states depends, in principle, on the ability of the policy-maker to justify those policies to any reasonable member of the society. 12 Public decision-making processes that involve public consultation can be described as searching for public consensus or as seeking distributive modes of justification, a "fair" compromise between individual preferences. 13 Over the past three decades, liberal political philosophy has worked to respond to challenges posed by feminists and communitarians in the context of demands for recognition of group difference in policy-making within pluralist societies 14 . These differences can strain the possibilities for meaningful consensus or question the fairness of compromise, and it is unclear that there is a neutral standing point that policy-makers can assume in their deliberations. 17 . Unless the process of public policy-making in these areas attends to the tensions and multiple valuesystems within society, the legitimacy of these policies will be called into
question. In what follows, we contrast approaches that seek consensus through compromise between competing values with an approach that engages all affected participants in a mode of deliberation towards the defensible resolution of problems through public reasoning. 18 
THREE APPROACHES TO ETHICAL DIFFERENCE IN POLICY DEBATE.
Existing NBOs take a number of different approaches to debate, public consultation, decision-making and contribution to policy formation in relation to a specific set of ethical issues. For the purposes of this paper we will distinguish among: 'interest group pluralism'; 'interest group pluralism coupled with public Bioethics and Democracy 17 consultation'; and an approach that we will call 'contested deliberation'. While most actual NBOs use somewhat mixed approaches, we have sought to highlight the tensions among these in a manner that exaggerates the effects of the differences to demonstrate our concerns.
Interest group pluralism
According to Iris Young, Interest group pluralism also excludes the wider public from the debate; at least it limits access to negotiations framing the debate. The deliberations between the different interest groups are not made public, the compromises are not revealed and there is no expression of a justification for why the outcome is framed in one way rather than another. Compromises of this sort are neither accountable, nor public.
Irwin says such expert-representatives achieve their exclusion by pre-framing the debate of the issues and ..that this framing misses out on more pervasive problems and anxieties.
Equally, the construction of the exercise around issues likely to be unfamiliar to participants and then providing factual information to overcome their assumed ignorance, suggests a return to the deficit theory of public groups as operating in a knowledge vacuum. 20 The question of pre-framing is a central issue for consultations of this kind, especially in emerging areas of scientific concern where researchers will inevitably find themselves both Bioethics and Democracy 20 generating and collecting public views about topics that have not previously been considered -and doing so in an unavoidably artificial and decontextualised fashion. 21 The subject matter of typical bioethical policy issues does require input from experts, for instance, those in relevant medical or scientific disciplines. However, it is less clear that the identification of ethical issues requires expertise, even if articulating those issues into bioethical discourse does. Citizens arguably can decide what for themselves is good or bad, desirable or undesirable, right or wrong. However, expressing those intuitions or opinions in a discourse that can be shared does require expertise in bioethics.
Critics of interest group pluralism note that it is an adversarial approach, and one that can stifle genuine debate, by requiring each representative participant to negotiate the "best outcome" given the interests of their group. Iris Young has argued that interest group pluralism de-politicises public life, as no critical distinction is made between the assertions of selfish interest and claims of justice or right.
Public policy dispute is only a competition among claims, and 'winning' depends on getting others on your side, making trades and alliances with others and making effective strategic calculations about how and to whom to make your claims. One does not win by persuading a public that one's claim is just. 22 Bioethics and Democracy 21
Interest group pluralism with public consultation
One approach that has been taken by many NBOs in attempting to avoid the problems with interest group pluralism that we have identified is to combine the interest group approach with some degree of public consultation. This approach does not seek public participation in the debate, but asks for a public response to a proposed policy determined by the interest groups' negotiations. This is a formal consultation that often does not allow for genuine public participation in the debate. The reasons for this include the following. First, the scope of public or stakeholder response is often very limited (e.g. in time frame, format of response, the questions the public are asked to address). In this way, the "pre-framing" of debate that Irwin criticised is perpetuated. Second, consultation is not genuinely public, as only some groups will be approached directly and asked to respond.
Where public consultation is required, the public notices for submissions are often buried in newspapers. Even if those notices are found, only those with time and resources can respond effectively. Any particular submission will only have a marginal effect, as, often, the policy makers will be obliged merely to "have regard to" the comments made in the consultative process, but no obligation to justify selective use of the material. Third, there is usually no public access to the original submissions, which would allow for public scrutiny of the ways in which submissions were used to shape policy.
Such confined or scripted consultation falls short of Amy Gutmann's ideal of deliberative democracy. She says
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At the core of deliberative democracy is the idea that citizens and officials must justify any demands for collective action by giving reasons that can be accepted by those who are bound by the action. When citizens morally disagree about public policy, they therefore should deliberate with one another, seeking moral agreement when they can and maintaining mutual respect when they cannot. 23 Equally, it would fall short of the social equality that, for Iris Young, is a goal of social justice. This refers primarily to …the full participation and inclusion of everyone in society's major institutions, and the socially supported substantive opportunity for all to develop and exercise their capacities and realize their choices. 24 The shortcomings of such formal and passive consultation have been recognised and improved processes that achieve on-going interaction devised, often engaging the power of information technology with positive effect. 25 
Contested deliberation
What appears to us to be needed is a hybrid derived from Gutmann's deliberative democracy and Young's approach to social justice. There needs to be an approach to deliberation that addresses the problem of correctly identifying relevant expertise while ensuring the capacity of those experts to participate reports, had adequate staffing and funding and had a broad mandate. 28 In his view, the predecessors and its immediate successor had not been sufficiently free of either Congressional or executive influence. In the terms we have used, this was a use of interest group pluralism by an advisory NBO that was successful for articulating the bioethical issues because it was not established as part of a policy making process. In our view, however, this approach is limited as a means of influencing policy, precisely because of its separation from the policymaking processes.
In another response to the OTA report, George Annas suggests that any national bioethics commission whose main job is, in effect, legislation (by regulation) will focus its work at the lowest common denominator of ethics, namely, the law, and not explore wider and deeper questions. 29 In our terms, he identifies one of the shortcomings of the second approach we outlined above, interest group pluralism with public consultation. He rejects the OTA's recommendation that Congress "should provide a voice for biomedical ethics in public policy", saying, "To the extent that bioethics is a field based on principle rather than compromise, politics can only corrupt it." 30 He concludes that the challenge for bioethics in America is to learn more of politics so that it can influence politics without corrupting itself.
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This corruption will occur if, he says, bioethics makes it seem that "ethical principles and practice are the result of compromise and majority votes rather than reason and virtue."
31
There appears here to be an assumption about the nature of bioethics, as somehow "outside" the social and political contexts that it critically examines, a view that is likely to be challenged. Nonetheless, whatever conception of bioethics is adopted, the important point is that processes involving NBOs need to be informed by ethical intuitions and opinions articulated into bioethical discourse by representatives and by public responses to a debate that is not reduced to interest group pluralism with passive and procedural (rather than substantive) public consultation. We advocate that at the third stage of policymaking on any NBO issue, there is a democratic obligation to demonstrate that all defensible positions that have been articulated through the NBO process by interested members of the wider community or by those with specific expertise have been taken into account. This obligation can only be satisfied by drawing recognisably bioethical views into debates framed to seek provisional agreement about policy. For this to be seen (or heard) to happen, there needs to be general agreement (but this agreement must also be contestable, hence open to argument) about the range of views that can be appropriately labelled as bioethical.
The contestability of the scope of bioethics and of democratic decision-making is not a reason to abandon the project of finding out how bioethics can best influence policy-making in a democracy marked by liberalism. Rather, it is recognition of the need for careful reflection on and identification of the assumptions on which the design of NBOs and related policy making processes rest. This paper has been our attempt to open that deliberative debate. 32 
